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LEGISLATIVE VETO AFTER INS V CHADHA
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, I the Supreme Court
invalidated the one-house legislative veto provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. 2 This Note considers whether Congress, in light of
Chadha, may continue to use the legislative veto for administrative over-
sight or whether it must adopt new methods to monitor administrative
agencies. The Note contends that the Court's reasoning invalidates not
only one-house vetoes or vetoes of adjudicative actions but all legislative
vetoes. The Note contends further that if Congress continues to exercise
the legislative veto, the federal courts will not be deterred from reaching
the merits of any case and determining the validity of any legislative




Congress has enacted approximately two hundred statutes contain-
ing legislative veto provisions.3 Congress adopted the veto procedure to
1 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
3 Justice White appended to his dissent a partial list of current federal statutes that
provide for legislative vetoes. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16. For a more complete list of
current federal statutes that contain legislative veto provisions, see The Supreme Court Decision in
INSv. Chad/ha and Its implicationsfor Congressional Oversight and Agency Rulemaking Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciag,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-102 (1983) [hereinafter cited as House Legislative Veto Hearings]; Wat-
son, Congress Steps Out: A Look At Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983,
1002-24, 1089-94 (1974).
The legislative veto apparently was first deployed in response to President Hoover's reor-
ganization of the executive branch in the Legislative Appropriation Act of 1932, Act of June
30, 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414 (repealed) (granting reorganization authority to
President whose decisions are subject to one-house veto). See Legislative Veto and the "Chadha"
Decisiom Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
theJudiciag, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Legislative Veto Hearings]. Although the legislative veto was employed only spar-
ingly immediately after 1932, with the growth of the federal bureaucracy, Congress has
turned to the veto device as a means of checking administrative agency actions. Congress
feels that a need exists for congressional oversight of the agencies. As Senator Grassley notes,
the federal regulatory matrix has become exceedingly complex and burdensome: the
"unelected" bureaucracy promulgates some 18 regulations for every statute that Congress
passes. See id at 1. Although the estimate as to the total number of statutes enacted since
1932 containing legislative vetoes varies, see, e.g., id. at 2 (statment of Sen. Grassley) (over 300
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control the increased authority delegated to the Executive in recent de-
cades. Through the legislative veto, Congress attempts to check admin-
istrative discretion by requiring agencies to submit specified proposed
actions to it for approval. If Congress disapproves the proposed action,
the agency may not go forward with it. Congress does not usually ex-
press its disapproval through formal legislation, but through committee
resolutions, one-house resolutions, or concurrent resolutions. Although
the legislative veto has long been the subject of controversy and com-
ment,4 Chadha was the Court's first ruling on the matter.
A. Facts
Chadha's claim arose when the House of Representatives vetoed a
suspension of deportation that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) had granted Chadha.5 Chadha, who held a British pass-
port, entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa in 1966
veto provisions in more than 269 statutes); id. at 159 (statement of Richard Smith, Chairman
of ABA Coordinating Group on Regulatory Reform, and Philip Harter) (318 veto provisions
in about 210 statutes), the vast majority of them have been included in statutes enacted since
1970. See id. at 2. Many of the veto provisions are in relatively insignificant statutes, see, e.g.,
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-332,
§ 2, 94 Stat. 1057 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1432(b)(2) (1982)) (allowing Congress by concur-
rent resolution to disallow a designation by Secretary of Commerce of certain areas as marine
sanctuary); National Parks and Recreational Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 1301, 92 Stat.
3467, 3549 (Secretary of Agriculture may only process exchanges of land in Montana between
Burlington Northern Railroad and the U.S. government in excess of 6,400 acres if authorized
by concurrent resolution), but others are in statutes that present significant separation of
powers concerns. See, e.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 684 (1982)) (requiring
President to submit to Congress proposals to spend appropriated funds at rate less than that
required by statute); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555, 556-57
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1976)) (Congress may direct President to withdraw immedi-
ately U.S. armed forces engaged in foreign hostilities if it has not declared war or statutorily
authorized the action). This Note does not address the validity of the latter two statutes. It
concentrates on the validity of the veto to check delegated authority; in the War Powers
Resolution and the Budget Act, Congress did not delegate authority to the Executive, but
sought to define and check the Executive's inherent constitutional authority. Accordingly,
these two statutes are not considered legislative vetoes for the purpose of this Note.
Despite the existence of so many statutes with legislative veto provisions, Congress has
chosen to use the device largely like Damocles's sword. Only 1,100 resolutions have been
introduced to veto some regulatory action of which only 230 have passed. One-half of the
vetoes have occurred in immigration cases similar to Chadha, one-fourth under the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, and another one-eighth in executive reorgani-
zation plans. See Senate Legislative Veto Hearings, supra, at 159 (statement of Smith and Harter).
Even in view of the very limited actual usage of the legislative veto and the availability of
other methods of overseeing agency actions, e.g., cutting off appropriations to recalcitrant
agencies, delegation of authority for limited time periods, more specific authorizing legisla-
tion, sunset legislation, or formal article I vetoes, Congress remains wedded to the veto, per-
ceiving that the threat of its use creates an indirect control on the agencies. For a general
history of the legislative veto power, see Watson, supra.
4 For a representative sampling of the literature discussing the legislative veto, both pro
and con, see Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2797 n.12 (White, J., dissenting).
5 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771-72.
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but remained after his visa expired in 1972. The INS instituted depor-
tation proceedings against Chadha in 1973. Chadha conceded that he
was deportable but filed an application for suspension of deportation
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act).6 The Act empowers
the Attorney General to suspend deportation and grant permanent resi-
dence status to an alien who is of "good moral character" and "whose
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in ex-
treme hardship."'7 Chadha alleged that neither Britain, the country
whose passport he held, nor Kenya, his place of birth, would allow him
to immigrate. He asserted that, in effect, he had become a man without
a country and that deportation would thus pose an extreme hardship to
him.8 The INS investigated Chadha's claim and on June 25, 1974, an
immigration judge granted his request for a suspension of the deporta-
tion proceedings. 9
By suspending the proceedings, the immigration judge triggered
the legislative veto in the Act. The Act requires the Attorney General to
file with Congress a report in every case in which deportation is sus-
pended detailing the factual and legal reasons supporting the suspension
of deportation proceedings. 10 The Act provides that if, prior to the end
of the session following the filing of the report, "either the Senate or
House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it
does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General
shall thereupon deport such alien."" Prior to the expiration of the fol-
lowing congressional session, the House passed a resolution disapproving
the granting of permanent resident status to Chadha on the grounds
that he had not demonstrated sufficient hardship.
12
6 Id.
7 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).
8 Chadha is of East Indian ancestry but he has never visited India. He was born in
Kenya when it was still part of the British Empire. He asserted at his suspension hearing that
none of these countries would permit him to immigrate. SeeJoint Appendix to Briefs at 13-
14, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
9 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
10 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982) ("If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the
provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent
provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such
suspension.").
11 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
12 121 CONG. REC. 40,800 (1975) (statement of Rep. Eilberg). The statutory period, see
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982), for congressional review of the Attorney General's suspension
order in Chadha's case was due to expire at the end of the first session of the 94th Congress.
That session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 CONG. REC. 42,104, 42,277 (1975). On De-
cember 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immi-
gration, Citizenship, and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing the orders
suspending deportation in several cases, including Chadha's. The House Judiciary Commit-
tee discharged the resolution to the full House on December 16, 1975. The printed copy of
the resolution was not available to the representatives at the time of the vote. Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. at 2771. Instead, Representative Eilberg, without reciting any specific facts, related to the
House that the Committee felt the aliens had not demonstrated sufficient hardship to meet
1246 [Vol. 69:1244
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After the House vetoed the order suspending deportation proceed-
ings, the immigration judge, in accordance with the Act, ordered
Chadha deported. Chadha filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the legislative veto was un-
constitutional.1 3 The court invited both the House and the Senate to
submit briefs amicus curiae. The court held that the House's action was
unconstitutional and directed the Attorney General not to deport
Chadha.14 The INS appealed, and both the House and Senate filed
petitions for a writ of certiorari.
B. Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto
In Chadha, the Court held that the House's veto of the order sus-
pending the deportation proceedings against Chadha was a legislative
act and, as such, that it violated the Constitution's requirement that the
Congress submit all legislation to the President for his approval.15 The
Court employed a two-step analysis in reaching this conclusion. First,
the Court found that the language and history of the Constitution re-
quire Congress to present all legislative acts to the President.16 Second,
the Court found that the legislative veto of the suspension order affected
the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982). 121 CONG. REC. 40,800 (1975). The House
then passed the resolution without debate or a recorded vote. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
13 See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2772. The INS agreed with Chadha's contention that the
legislative veto was unconstitutional. Despite its agreement with Chadha's position on the
unconstitutionality of the legislative veto, the INS intended to comply with the House's veto.
Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980). Both the
court of appeals, see id at 419, and the Supreme Court, see 103 S. Ct. at 2778, found sufficient
adversity between the INS and Chadha to present a justiciable case or controversy.
14 Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1980).
The court of appeals decision has already received attention in the literature and is not fur-
ther considered in this Note. See Comment, Limiting the Legislative Veto: Chadha v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1721 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Limiting
the Legislative Veto]; Comment, Legislative Veto-One House Veto of NS Action Held Invalid, 5
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 285 (1981); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 123 (1981).
15 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786-87. The Court also held that the one-house veto of a
suspension of deportation violated the requirement of article I, sections 1 and 7, which require
that both houses pass all legislation. Id at 2783-84, 2786-87.
The Court also discussed the concept of separation of powers, the ground on which the
court of appeals invalidated the legislative veto provision. The Court noted that the doctrine
of separation of powers is "woven" into the Constitution, id at 2781 (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1975)), and that the Court relied on the doctrine in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976). In Buckly, the Court invalidated a scheme under which congres-
sional leaders would appoint certain members of the Federal Election Commission. See Buck-
ley, 424 U.S. at 143. The Court in Bucklq did not, however, rest its holding solely on the
doctrine of separation of powers, but held that that appointment procedure violated the ap-
pointment power given to the President in article II, section 2, clause 2. 424 U.S. at 124-36.
Similarly, the Court in Chadha recognized that the case involved separation of powers issues,
but found that the presentment clauses in article I, section 7 and the bicameral requirement
for passing legislation adequately vindicated those concerns in this case. 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
16 See in fra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
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the rights of persons outside the legislature and was, therefore, a legisla-
tive act.
17
The majority began its analysis by looking at the language of the
Constitution. t8 The Constitution contains two clauses requiring the
Congress to present all bills that have passed both houses to the Presi-
dent for his approval. Article I, section 7, clause 2 requires Congress to
submit "Every Bill" to the President1 9 and article I, section 7, clause 3
requires Congress to submit "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote" to the
President.
20
The Court concluded that the framers drafted the presentment
clauses as part of their scheme of separation of powers. The Court as-
serted that the framers intended those clauses to establish the President's
power to veto all congressional actions. In effect, the veto was the Presi-
dent's defense against the Congress. 2 1 The majority supported these
conclusions by noting that at the Philadelphia convention, the framers
revised the text of article I, section 7 to ensure that the Congress could
not circumvent the President's veto power. The original draft of section
7 contained only the first presentment clause requiring Congress to sub-
mit to the President "Every Bill."' 22 At the convention, James Madison
observed that Congress might avoid the presentment provision of section
7 simply by calling a proposed law a "resolution" or a "vote" rather
than a "bill."' 23 The next day the convention added the second present-
ment clause-the present clause 3-in an attempt to ensure that Con-
gress could not circumvent the possibility of the President's veto merely
by relabeling its actions.24 Thus, the majority's reading of the express
language of article I, section 7 and its analysis of the proceedings at the
17 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
18 See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States.").
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur-
rence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be
presented to the President of the United States.").
21 "If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to
invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic
propriety would of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left to the
mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power
of self-defense. . . . The primary inducement to conferring the power in
question upon the Executive is to enable him to defend himself. . . ."
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2782 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 457-58 (A. Hamilton) (H.
Lodge ed. 1888)). The framers apparently were uniformly in agreement that Congress should
have to present all legislation to the President before it became law. Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. (citing 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 301-02 (1966)).
24 Id. The Court cited two cases in its discussion of the President's veto power, but the
cases are only tangentially related to the question at hand. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. 655 (1928) (bill not signed by President does not become law even if Congress adjourns
[Vol. 69:12441248
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Constitutional Convention convinced it that Congress may enact legisla-
tion only "in accord with a single, finely wrought . . .procedure.
'25
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White took issue with the major-
ity's interpretation of the framers' intent.26 Justice White argued that
the delegates at the Philadelphia convention gave only brief considera-
tion to the second presentment clause and that they did not contemplate
that it impose any broad restraints on congressional authority.27 Justice
White argued that, in any event, determination of the framers' intent in
drafting the presentment clauses was not dispositive. In his view, the
crucial issue before the Court was whether congressional exercise of the
legislative veto constitutes a legislative act.
28
The majority agreed with Justice White that article I and the fram-
ers' intent in drafting the presentment clause were not the central con-
cerns in the case. They merely viewed this as an appropriate starting
point for the analysis, recognizing that a conclusion at this stage could
not be determinative. Not every congressional action is subject to the
requirements of the presentment clauses. Thus, the majority moved to
the second level of their analysis and considered whether the House's
veto of the order suspending Chadha's deportation was an act of legisla-
tion, or a matter internal to Congress-such as the refusal of a commit-
tee to report legislation to the floor of the House-to which the
presentment clauses do not apply. The majority asserted that
"[w]hether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exer-
cise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon 'whether
they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its
character and effect.' "29
The crux of the majority's argument that the veto provision in the
Act was legislative in character and effect was that application of the
veto affected the rights of persons outside the Congress. 30 The immigra-
tion judge's order suspending the deportation proceedings against
Chadha gave him the legal right to stay in the United States. The
House's resolution vetoing the suspension order thus altered Chadha's
rights because after the veto, the Act required the Attorney General to
deport Chadha.31 In addition, the majority asserted that the House veto
of the suspension order constituted a partial revocation of the authority
before President returns bill); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (held President has
power to remove appointed officials).
25 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
26 Id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 2800.
28 Id. at 2799.
29 Id. at 2784 (citation omitted).
30 See id.
31 Id. at 2784-85.
1984] 1249
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that Congress had previously delegated to the Attorney General.3 2 The
majority contended that absent the Act's legislative veto provision,
neither house of Congress, acting alone, could have altered the Attorney
General's power to suspend deportation proceedings against specific per-
sons.33 Thus, the majority reasoned that Congress must abide by the
delegations it makes unless it revokes or alters them through the formal
legislative process.
34
Justice White disputed the majority's conclusion that the House's
action was a legislative act, arguing that the House did not affect
Chadha's or the Attorney General's rights when it disapproved the sus-
pension order. Justice White contended that Congress did not, in the
Act, delegate authority to the Attorney General to suspend deporta-
tions, reasoning that a suspension of deportation authorized by the At-
torney General takes effect only if both houses of Congress acquiesce.
Because, in Justice White's view, all deportation cases are subject to con-
gressional review, a resolution by one house disapproving an order sus-
pending deportation does not change a deportable alien's status. He
concluded that disapproval by one house of a suspension merely left an
alien deportable and Congress would not, therefore, have changed the
status quo.
3 5
In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment,3 6 Justice Pow-
ell did not address the question of whether the legislative veto consti-
tuted a legislative act within the meaning of article I, section 7. Rather,
he argued that Congress usurped a judicial power when it vetoed the
suspension of deportation, reasoning that the determination of whether
Chadha and the other aliens met the statutory criteria for permanent
residence is a "function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts.
3 7
C. Severability and Standing
One of the reasons that Zmmzgration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha
32 Id. at 2785.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 2786. The Court also asserted that the fact that the Immigration and National-
ity Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982), replaced a scheme in which Congress dealt with these
cases by private bills that suspended deportation provided additional proof of the legislative
nature of the veto. 103 S. Ct. at 2786. For additional support, the majority noted that the
Constitution explicitly lists two types of actions that each house may take unilaterally, thus
indicating that neither house possesses general powers of unilateral action. Id.
35 Id. at 2807 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also emphasized the usefulness of
the legislative veto in the modern administrative state in view of the dilemma Congress faces
when it must choose between delegating large amounts of authority or undertaking "a hope-
less task of writing laws. . . to cover endless special circumstances." Id at 2793. The major-
ity, on the other hand, stated that "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful. . . will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution." Id at 2780-81
(majority opinion).
36 Id at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 2791 (Powell, J., concurring).
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is the first case in which the Supreme Court has reviewed the constitu-
tionality of the legislative veto is that plaintiffs have had problems estab-
lishing standing to challenge the veto's constitutionality. In Chadha, for
example, Congress attempted to prevent the Court from reaching the
constitutional question on the ground that Chadha lacked standing to
maintain his suit.38 The Court, however, rejected the challenge to
Chadha's standing.3 9
Congress grounded its argument that Chadha lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the legislative veto on severability
analysis. Congress contended that the provisions of the Act that dele-
gated authority to the Attorney General were not severable from the
legislative veto provision in the Act.40 It argued that the two provisions
were inextricably linked. Thus, if the legislative veto clause was invalid,
so too was the clause that granted the Attorney General the authority to
suspend deportation proceedings. Under this analysis, even if the Court
agreed with Chadha's argument that the legislative veto clause was un-
constitutional, the Court would be unable to reinstate the Attorney
General's suspension order. The relief provisions of the Act would fall
along with the legislative veto clause.41 It is, of course, well-settled that
to satisfy the requirements of standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury
that is within the court's power to redress.42 The residency rights of
aliens are governed by federal statutes and, thus, a federal court has no
general federal common law authority to grant relief to an alien. The
Court, in invalidating the legislative veto provision in the Act, would at
the same time invalidate the inseverable provision authorizing the At-
torney General to suspend deportation. The plaintiff, therefore, would
have no basis for relief. Congress argued that because Chadha was
thereby denied any basis for relief, he lacked standing. Lower courts
had accepted this reasoning in prior cases,43 and the Supreme Court
38 Id. at 2774 (majority opinion).
39 Id. at 2774-76. In addition to rejecting Congress's inseverability argument, the Court
also rejected contentions that Chadha lacked standing because his claim would advance the
interests of the executive branch, id. at 2776, that there was insufficient adverseness between
Chadha and the INS, id. at 2778, and that the matter was a political question, id. at 2778-79.
40 See id. at 2774-76.
41 See id
42 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1983) ("[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III re-
quires the party who invokes the court's authority to [have an injury that] 'is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision' ") (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38 (1976)); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
79 (1978) (article III requires litigant to show "substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury").
43 See McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1011 (1978). In McCorkle, federal employees challenged a pay act under which the President
made salary proposals that would become effective if not vetoed by Congress. The Court held
that Congress would not have delegated the authority to set salaries to the President without
the veto power. The McCorkle court reasoned that because the congressional veto was not
1984] 1251
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apparently concurred. 44 It avoided the full ramifications of the argu-
ment in this case by finding the legislative veto provision severable from
the rest of the Act.
45
In finding that Chadha had standing to challenge the legislative
veto provision of the Act, the majority relied on the statement of the
severability test announced in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commzs-
szon.46 The Champlin test provides that provisions in a statute are severa-
ble "[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted
those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which
is not."' 47 The majority concluded that Congress would have enacted
the provision delegating suspension authority to the Attorney General
even if it had known that it could not constitutionally retain veto power
over his actions.
48
The majority listed three reasons why Congress would have enacted
severable from the part of the statute granting the President the authority to fix salaries, the
court would have to invalidate the entire statute if it concluded that the legislative veto was
unconstitutional. Because invalidating the statute would eliminate the plaintiff's basis for
relief, the court refused to consider the constitutionality of the legislative veto and dismissed
the case for lack of standing. 559 F.2d at 1261-62. See also Consumer Energy Council of Am.
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 441 & n.48 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to
decide whether inseverability was complete barrier to standing because legislative veto provi-
sions found to be severable), aff'dmem. andcert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Atkins v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1038, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J., dissenting) (arguing that pay raises
proposed by President are effective immediately, rather than after Congress acquiesces, and
therefore "are enforceable, provided [the veto] is severable from the remainder of the [Act]").
44 In discussing Congress's assertion that Chadha lacked standing because his claim
would advance the interests of the executive, the Court stated: "If the veto provision violates
the Constitution, and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be cancelled."
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2776. The Court did not, however, discuss the matter further, or cite
any authority in support of its standing argument. Although Justice Rehnquist dissented on
the severability issue, id. at 2816, he did not discuss the standing issue. Thus, although the
courts apparently accept the standing/severability argument, they have not yet addressed the
anomaly that now exists where the probability that the courts will review a veto of executive
action is inversely related to the importance of the veto provision in a particular statutory
scheme.
45 See id. at 2775-76 (majority opinion).
46 286 U.S. 210 (1932). Champlin and the other severability cases relied on by the major-
ity involved standing issues different from those in Chadha. In Champlin, petitioners chal-
lenged the validity of several provisions of a state law regulating the production of crude oil.
The Court would not, however, consider the validity of a section under which no orders had
been issued because, even if invalid, the provision was severable. 286 U.S. at 234-35. In Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976), the Court invalidated certain spending limits in the
Federal Election Campaign Act, but held that the public financing provisions of the act were
valid and severable. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 586 (1968), the Court struck
down the death penalty provision in a federal kidnapping statute, but held that convictions
under the statute could stand because the death penalty provision was severable. In none of
the cases, however, would a finding of inseverability have led to the situation in which a
statutory provision would apply to a party and yet be unreviewable because in none of these
cases would the court have simultaneously eliminated the plaintiff's remedy when it invali-
dated the challenged statutory provision.
47 Champhn, 286 U.S. at 234.
48 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
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the suspension of deportation procedure even without retaining a legis-
lative veto. The majority first noted that the Act contained a severabil-
ity clause, 49 giving rise to a presumption of severability.50 Second, the
majority turned to the legislative history of the Act, and asserted that it
demonstrated that Congress found the private bill approach to deporta-
tions so cumbersome5 l that it would not have maintained the private
bill system even had it known that the legislative veto was unconstitu-
tional.52 Finally, the majority observed that the suspension system
would remain workable even without the legislative veto 53 and that
Congress would retain review of suspensions under the provisions of the
Act that require the Attorney General to report each suspension of de-
portation to Congress.54 The only difference in congressional review of
suspension orders in the absence of the legislative veto is that Congress
must pass legislation, 55 using the procedure prescribed in article I, sec-
tion 7, instead of a veto resolution, to reverse the Attorney General's
suspension order.
5 6
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the legislative veto
provision was not severable from the provision of the Act granting to the
Attorney General the authority to suspend deportation orders.57 Justice
Rehnquist first eschewed reliance on the Act's severability clause, argu-
ing that the presence of the severability clause did not conclusively
49 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note (1982) ("If any particular provision of this Act [this chapter], or
the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the
Act [this chapter] and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.").
50 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
51 Id. at 2775.
52 Id
53 Id. This criterion is also derived from Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234.
54 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2775-76. Chadha reaffirmed the laying system, originally ap-
proved in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1941), in which new regulations do not take
effect until Congress has had an opportunity to review them and pass legislation rejecting
them. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2776 n.9.
Senator Javits argued that the laying procedure is not an effective means of congressional
oversight of administrative agencies because it involves new legislation which entails the "full
panoply of Congressional action." Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto:
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 462, 463-64 (1977). Senator Javits's argu-
ment ignores the fact that although the bicameral and presentment procedures for enacting
legislation are constitutionally required, the Constitution does not require the cumbersome
procedures of committee review, floor consideration, and conference. Congress could easily
adopt special rules for expedited consideration of administrative actions. The alternatives to
the legislative veto are discussed in Kaiser, CongressionalAction to Overturn Agency Rules: Alterna-
tives to the Legislative Veto, 32 AD. L. RaV. 667 (1980). See also Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786 n.19;
Senate Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Sen. Grassley); id. at 5 (state-
ment of Sen. Heflin).
55 The Court explicitly declined to consider whether the passage of legislation ordering
the deportation of specific individuals would constitute a bill of attainder thereby running
afoul of the Constitution in a different manner. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.17.
56 Id. at 2775-76.
57 Id. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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demonstrate a congressional intent to render the legislative veto provi-
sion severable from the remainder of the Act.58 He argued that the
Court should have examined the entire legislative history and back-
ground of the statute.59 He emphasized that the veto restricts adminis-
trative authority by subjecting administrative actions to congressional
review. Justice Rehnquist argued that when a court invalidates such a
restriction, it creates a broader delegation of power than Congress in-
tended.6 0 Finally, Justice Rehnquist asserted that because Congress had
retained the power to veto suspension orders over many years, it never
indicated, and the Court had no evidence from which to infer, that it
would have delegated the suspension power to the Attorney General
without retaining a veto power.
6'
58 Indeed, during the House and Senate Hearings held in the wake of the Chadha deci-
sion in July of 1983, several witnesses testified that the insertion of severability clauses into
statutes is not always the result of reasoned thinking and legislative compromise but is often a
"Pavlovian" response in polishing up legislation, similar to the inclusion of legal boilerplate in
contracts. See, e.g., Senate Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 3, at 41 (exchange between
Michael Davidson, Counsel to the Senate, and Stanley Brand, Counsel to the House Clerk);
id. at 103 (testimony of Brand before the House); id at 123 (exchange between Louis Fisher
and Norman Ornstein). In view of the discretion that a severability clause gives a court to
"rewrite" legislation, these witnesses urged Congress to include a severability clause only
when it clearly reflects the congressional intent.
Even if Congress takes that track, it may still go for naught. The judicial presumption in
favor ofseverability is very strong. In the Consumer Energy Councilcase, the D.C. Circuit held a
veto provision in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 33-34 (1982)), unconstitutional and severable from the rest of the
statute despite the lack of severability clause. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a 'dmem. and cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
59 103 S. Ct. at 2816.
60 Id. at 2817.
61 Id. Justice Rehnquist's dissent on the severability issue is unconvincing. He did not
adequately explain his refusal to rely on the severability clause in the statute. He also failed
to provide a convincing analysis of legislative intent with respect to the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Justice Rehnquist cited two cases to justify his refusal to follow the sever-
ability clause in the Act, but they do not support his position. See United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936). Both cases
merely state that a severability clause does not conclusively demonstrate legislative intent;
neither case holds that severability clauses are irrelevant, nor that severability clauses do not
raise a presumption of severability. Jackson actually involved a statute that did not have a
severability clause: the Court merely stated that the legislative intent was still the determin-
ing factor. 390 U.S. at 585 n.27. Justice Rehnquist's view on the effect of the severability
clause is novel. See 2 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44.08 (rev. 3d
ed. 1973) ("Because a separability clause purports to be an expression of the legislative intent,
it is logical to view the inquiry when a separability clause is present in an act as being con-
cerned . . . with determining only whether the valid portion is sufficiently independent [to
enforce]."). In addition, Justice Rehnquist does not refute the majority's argument that Con-
gress would have enacted the suspension procedure even if it knew it could riot constitution-
ally retain the veto power. Justice Rehnquist's argument that the mere fact that Congress
retained the veto provision over a period of years demonstrated that Congress would not have
delegated the authority to suspend deportations without it lacks merit. Prior to the Court's
decision in Chadha, Congress was unaware that the Court would hold the veto invalid and,
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II
ANALYSIS: CAN CONGRESS AVOID THE EFFECT
OF CHADHA?
Congressional use of the legislative veto to oversee the activities of
administrative agencies has proliferated in the last few decades.
62
Notwithstanding the Court's decision in Chadha, Congress has continued
to veto agency actions.63 Furthermore, Congress has not yet amended
the statutes that contain legislative veto provisions to remove those pro-
visions. 64 This Note focuses, therefore, on two questions: whether
Chadha invalidates all legislative vetoes and, if so, whether all vetoes are
subject to attack through the courts.
A. Breadth of the Court's Decision
The majority's opinion in Chadha is of a breadth seldom seen in
Supreme Court opinions. The opinion appears to leave few questions
unanswered. First, Congress will be unable to evade the Court's conclu-
sion that a legislative veto is a legislative act that the Constitution re-
quires be presented to the President for approval.65 Second, because the
Court invalidated the legislative veto on the ground that it was a legisla-
tive act, it will be of no significance in future litigation whether the chal-
therefore, never faced the crucial choice of whether to delegate that authority without having
a veto power or to retain the private bill system.
Justice White also asserted that the severability clause did not conclusively demonstrate
a congressional intent to delegate the suspension authority regardless of the constitutionality
of the veto provision. He argued that the severability clause relates only to the divisibility of
the major provisions of the Act, "not [to] different provisions within a single section." 103 S.
Ct. at 2798 n.16 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White did not explain why he chose to ignore
the clear wording of the severability clause: "If any particular provision of this Act [this chap-
ter] . . . is held invalid, the remainder. . . shall not be affected thereby." 8 U.S.C. § 1101
note (1982) (emphasis added). See also 2 C. SANDS, supra, § 44.08 ("In absence of statements
to the contrary, a separability clause refers to every provision of an act.").
62 See supra note 3.
63 See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983) (litigation
involving committee suspension of lease of federal land by Department of Interior); N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1984, at A27, col. 4 (noting introduction of resolution to veto action of District
of Columbia government). The continuing congressional use of the legislative veto has not
gone unchallenged, however. More litigation is percolating up through the courts seeking to
define the outer parameters of the Chadha decision and permissible use of the veto. For exam-
ple, Congress pressed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Consumer Council of Am. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), ad mem. and cet. denied 103 S.
Ct. 3556 (1983). In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983), con-
gressional intervenors argued that committee suspension of leases made by the Secretary of
the Interior did not constitute a legislative veto. The court rejected this contention, id. at
1155-56, but enjoined the sale on other grounds. Id. at 1157-58. Congress continues to press
its position, which it argued in Chadha, that the veto matter is a political question not amena-
ble to judicial review.
64 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1984, at A27, col. 4 (noting that Congress has not en-
acted a new Home Rule Act for the District of Columbia).
65 See 103 S. Ct. at 2782-83; supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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lenged provision permits a one-house or a two-house legislative veto. 66
Finally, because the majority chose not to draw a functional distinction
between administrative rulemaking and administrative adjudicatory ac-
tions,67 in future cases, the Court will strike down legislative vetoes of
administrative rulemaking as well as vetoes of adjudicatory decisions
such as that involved in Chadha. Thus, Chadha apparently invalidates all
forms of the legislative veto.
The Court began with an analysis of the presentment clauses. It
concluded that the history and text of the presentment clauses indicate
that the framers' objective in drafting article I, section 7 was to prevent
Congress from evading the President's veto by developing new proce-
dural devices to enact laws that would not be governed by the same
restrictions as those placed on "bills," "orders," and "resolutions. ' 6 Al-
though Justice White argued that the mere existence of the presentment
clauses does not answer the ultimate question of whether a legislative
veto is legislation subject to the restrictions of article I, section 7,69 the
inclusive nature of those clauses serves as a guide in determining
whether a veto constitutes legislation.
The majority stated a broad but simple test to determine whether a
legislative veto constitutes legislation. The test it proposed is a func-
tional one: any exercise of power by Congress that affects the "legal
rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislat[ure] ' ' 70 is
an exercise of legislative power subject to all the requirements for legisla-
tion, including presentment to the President.
Justice White in his dissenting opinion did not persuasively refute
the Court's conclusion that the veto of the suspension of deportation
order constituted legislation. He argued that because Congress retained
the veto power, in section 244(c)(2), over suspension of deportation or-
66 See 103 S. Ct. at 2783-88.
67 But see id. at 2790-92 (Powell, J., concurring); id at 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
68 Justice White's argument that the framers intended no major role for the second pre-
sentment clause, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, is without merit. The majority's
analysis follows an accepted approach to legislative history. The framers considered an origi-
nal text consisting of article I, section 7, clause 2 standing alone, but discerned a problem with
it, namely the possibility noted earlier that the Congress might circumvent the veto power.
The convention then adopted additional text. The logical conclusion is that the framers in-
tended the added text to address the possibility of congressional circumvention. See 2 C.
SANDS, supra note 61, § 48.18 ("Adoption of an amendment is evidence that the legislature
intended to change the provisions of the original bill.").
Notwithstanding this analysis, there is some support for Justice White's position; some
commentators have previously argued that the intent of the framers in adding the third
clause is ambiguous. See, e.g., Javits & Klein, supra note 54, at 480-8 1; cf Miller & Knapp, The
Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 380 (1977) (arguing
that lack of guidance from framers suggests that presentment clauses should be interpreted
strictly).
69 See 103 S. Ct. at 2798-99 (White, J., dissenting).
70 Id at 2784 (majority opinion).
1256 [Vol. 69:1244
INS v. CHADHA
ders, it never effectively delegated suspension authority to the Attorney
General. 7 1 Therefore, he concluded, the House resolution disapproving
the suspension of deportation did not upset the status quo. The facts in
Chadha illustrate the weakness of the argument. If the House had not
adopted the disapproval resolution, Chadha would have remained in
the United States as a permanent resident. Once the House passed the
veto resolution, however, the INS was forced, under the statutory
scheme, to deport Chadha, 72 thereby altering his legal status. Even if
one accepts Justice White's analysis of what authority Congress actually
delegated to the Attorney General and what that meant for an alien's
status, it does not, under the peculiar statutory scheme involved in
Chadha, avoid the majority's conclusion that the legislative veto mecha-
nism allows Congress to change legal rights without passing legislation.
Justice White noted that an alien remains deportable even after the At-
torney General grants relief. If Congress does not act within the period
specified in the Act, however, the alien achieves resident status. Under
Justice White's analysis, then, it is not congressional action but rather
congressional inaction that confers new legal rights. The statute does,
therefore, contemplate a change in legal status in which Congress plays
a role, a change which, under the majority's test, is subject to the re-
quirements of the presentment clauses.
Justice White's argument that Congress never delegated suspension
authority to the Attorney General because it reserved the veto power is
really nothing more than a declaration that the veto provision is not
severable from the rest of the Act. His argument essentially is that the
veto was a crucial component of a complete legislative mechanism that
never granted power to the Attorney General to make final decisions on
residency. Again, however, the majority seems to have the better argu-
ment. It persuasively marshaled evidence indicating that Congress had
tired of the private bill relief approach and would have delegated the
suspension power to the Attorney General even if it had known it could
not retain a veto power.
73
The sweeping reasoning of the majority opinion has two other im-
portant consequences. Although the veto provision invalidated in
Chadha was a one-house veto, the majority's reasoning is broad enough
to invalidate two-house vetoes as well. Although the Court held that the
one-house veto violated the requirement that legislation be passed by
both chambers, 74 it placed its greatest reliance on the circumvention of
the President's veto power. 75 Thus, a two-house legislative veto, by
71 See id. at 2803-04 (White, J.,dissenting).
72 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
74 See supra note 15.
75 See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
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avoiding presentment to the President, still falls short of meeting all of
the requirements for legislation set forth in article I, section 7. The ma-
jority's opinion clearly requires that all legislation meet all the
requirements.
Finally, the majority opinion, unlike Justice Powell's concurring
opinion, leaves no room for a distinction between a legislative veto of an
administrative rulemaking and a veto of an administrative adjudica-
tion.76 In Chadha, the Attorney General made a determination of the
rights of a single individual based upon criteria set forth in a statute.
The Court could have distinguished between legislative vetoes of the
results of rulemaking and of adjudication, as Justice Powell urged, on
the ground that rulemaking is legislative in nature. Therefore, Congress
arguably invades no prerogative of the executive or judiciary when it
prevents promulgation of a new regulation by veto. Congressional ve-
toes of decisions made in an administrative adjudication, on the other
hand, interfere with a process that determines the rights of individuals; a
process that requires procedural due process safeguards and the availa-
bility of judicial review.
77
The majority, however, chose not to draw this distinction. It found
that all legislative actions that affect persons outside the legislative
branch must be accomplished according to the procedures prescribed by
article 1.78 In applying the test to the facts of Chadha, the Court noted
that the veto affected not only the rights of Chadha, but also of persons
in the executive branch. 79 Accordingly, when a congressional veto pre-
vents an agency official from promulgating a regulation he would other-
wise have issued, it affects the rights and duties of that official. Chadha
indicates that the legislature can only effect such changes in rights
through exercise of legislative authority as conceived under article 1.80
76 The court of appeals, which decided the case on the grounds of separation of powers,
see supra note 17 for a more detailed discussion, also left room for such a distinction. Chadha
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 432 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Nathanson,
Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative Veto, and the "Independent
Agencies," 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1064, 1086-87 (arguing that intervention in agency proceedings
is clearly unconstitutional, but that quasi-adjudicative and quasi-legislative proceedings may
be difficult to distinguish in current administrative practice); Comment, Limiting the Legislative
Veto, supra note 14, at 1730 (noting that court of appeals decision if upheld, would preclude
use of legislative veto in adjudicatory context); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Legislative
Veto, supra note 14, at 133-34 (arguing that legislative veto of adjudicatory actions should be
treated as presumptively unconstitutional).
77 It is well established that due process requires that Congress not interfere with ongo-
ing agency adjudications. See, e.g., Pillsbury v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). In Pills-
hu, the chairman of the FTC was questioned extensively at a Senate subcommittee hearing
about an ongoing case. The appellate court subsequently rescinded a divestiture order that
the FTC had issued in the case. Id. at 965.
78 See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784; supra notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
79 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
80 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit had overturned a legislative veto of administrative regulations. See Con-
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B. Severability and Standing after Chadha
Although the Court in Chahda in effect held that all legislative veto
provisions are unconstitutional, some statutes that contain legislative
veto provisions may, nevertheless, be invulnerable to judicial attack if
the veto provision is not severable from the rest of the statute. Under
severability analysis no judicial remedy exists where the invalid or un-
constitutional provision is deemed inseverable from the rest of the stat-
ute. A remedy is absent because invalidating the veto provision
necessarily entails invalidating the remainder of the enabling legislation
thereby eliminating the statutory basis on which a court could grant
relief. For purposes of this severability analysis, it is necessary to distin-
guish between statutes that seek to confer benefits, such as the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, and statutes that regulate behavior and
require governmental enforcement. 81 A finding that the legislative veto
provision is severable eliminates the standing problems with respect to
either type of statute. Although the broad severability analysis in
Chadha suggests that most legislative veto provisions will be severable,
certain legislative veto provisions cannot be severed. Standing problems
will not prevent judicial invalidation of legislative veto provisions
deemed inseverable in statutes that regulate behavior and require gov-
ernmental enforcement. Standing problems, however, will allow Con-
gress to continue to exercise legislative vetoes in statutes that merely
confer benefits and contain inseverable veto provisions.
There are three reasons why, in the wake of Chadha, courts will find
most legislative vetoes severable. First, the Champlin test, which the
Court relied on in Chadha, creates a presumption in favor of severability,
even in cases where the statute does not contain an explicit severability
clause.82 The Champlin test requires a court to treat specific provisions in
a statute as severable unless the legislature clearly would not have en-
acted the statute without those provisions. The burden of proof in the
test accords a virtual presumption of severability.
Second, the Court, in Chadha, effected a subtle change in the sever-
ability issue that strengthened the presumption of severability. The
question is no longer merely what the legislature intended, but what
Congress would have done had it known the veto provision would be
sumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
afdmem and cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
81 E.g., The National Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, §§ 122(c), 202(c),
206(d)(2), 507, 92 Stat. 3350, 3370-72, 3380, 3406 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3332, 3342(c),
3346(d) (2), 3417 (1982)) (veto by concurrent resolution over reimposition of natural gas price
controls by President).
82 The rule embraced by the Court in Champlin is that invalid portions of a statute
should be severed "unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not." Champlin Refin-
ing Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1931).
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held invalid.8 3 The revised formulation forces courts to answer a hypo-
thetical question. In Chadha, however, the Court managed a convincing
answer. The Court's severability formulation will lead courts to find
most legislative veto provisions severable because of the burdensome na-
ture of the duties Congress has delegated to the executive branch and
agencies in many of the statutes that contain legislative vetoes. When
Congress enacted the statutes that contain legislative vetoes, it faced a
choice between retaining legislative authority or delegating. Congress
presumably chose to delegate to the agencies in many of these situations
because it faced pressing matters of greater national import and would
have found it difficult to conduct the detailed investigations, hearings,
and rulemaking proceedings that prudent lawmaking requires and that
administrative agencies are able to conduct.
84
The Court in Chadha focused on the burdensome nature of this
technical, time-consuming, detailed work and argued that "Congress'
desire to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation but
must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden." 85
This "irritation" is not unique to immigration cases; it extends to most
of the areas in which Congress has chosen to delegate. Thus, with re-
spect to most statutes, if Congress had faced a choice of delegating with-
out the veto or retaining complete legislative control, it would normally
have elected to delegate.
The third reason that most legislative provisions will be severable
after Chadha86 is that most statutes that contain legislative vetoes will
remain workable without the legislative veto. Because the legislative
veto provisions pertain only to review of administrative action, agencies
can continue to perform the work delegated to them even after a court
invalidates the legislative veto pi'ovisions of the authorizing legislation.
83 The Court determined that the veto provision in the Act was severable on the
grounds that "there is insufficient evidence that Congress would have continued to subject
itself to the onerous burdens of private bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be held
unconstitutional." Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
84 The sloppy performance of the House in reviewing the suspension of deportation or-
ders from which the Chadha case arose suggests that Congress is incapable of effectively re-
viewing administrative actions through the legislative veto system. The last minute, hastily
considered House vote, unaccompanied by any statement of findings and supporting ration-
ale was far less thorough than the proceeding conducted by the INS. The INS proceedings
consisted of an investigation, hearings, and filings by Chadha, culminating in a written re-
port. Because of the time-consuming nature of conducting such detailed proceedings on a
wide variety of individual petitions, Congress would, as Justice White noted, face a "hopeless
task" if it could not delegate such chores to the executive. Id. at 2793 (White, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 2775.
86 Most lower court decisions prior to Chadha held legislative veto provisions severable.
See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aJfdmem. andcert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Chadha v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), afd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). But see
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982); McCorkle v.
United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
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The Court, in Chadha, considered in particular the consequences that
invalidating the legislative veto would have on agencies. The Court
noted that the provisions of the Act that require the Attorney General to
report all suspensions of deportation to Congress would remain valid
and Congress could still review the Attorney General's actions before
they took effect. The only difference is in the form of action taken pur-
suant to such review; Congress must now enact legislation and present it
to the President for his approval rather than merely passing a resolution
to reverse the Attorney General's decision.
8 7
Even under the majority's analysis, which favors severability, cer-
tain legislative vetoes that are contained in statutes that delegate ex-
traordinary authority 8 are not severable because Congress probably
would not have delegated the authority without the veto. As Chadha
indicates, such inseverable legislative vetoes may be immune from judi-
cial attack because of standing problems.89
87 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
88 An example is the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reor-
ganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) [hereinafter cited as the Home Rule
Act], in which Congress established a home rule government for the District, but retained a
legislative veto over District actions. Despite the showing of an intent to delegate, the Home
Rule Act is notable for its retention of congressional authority over the District. Congress, in
fact, dedicated an entire title to reservation of its veto power. Home Rule Act §§ 601-604.
The Home Rule Act contains three separate legislative vetoes: a one house veto over any
change in the criminal code, Home Rule Act, § 602(c)(2); a veto over any nonemergency
district council action by concurrent resolution, Home Rule Act § 602(c)(1); and a veto over
any charter amendments if not affirmatively approved by concurrent resolution, Home Rule
Act § 303(b).
The legislative history of the Home Rule Act supports the inseverability of the veto pro-
visions from the delegation of authority sections. Both the Senate and House reports empha-
sized that one of the purposes of the legislation was retention of Congress's authority over the
District. The House Report stated that the purpose of the legislation is "to relieve the Con-
gress of the burden of legislating on essentially local matters, but to provide a mechanism to
prevent any excesses in the exercise of local governmental authority with respect to the Fed-
eral interest." H.R. REP. No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973). The Senate report states
that: "The constitutional power of Congress over the affairs of the District of Columbia
would be retained and the Charter Act provides for a Congressional veto by either the House
of Representatives or the Senate of any act of the city Council." S. REP. No. 219, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1973).
The legislative history, together with the provisions of the Home Rule Act, provide con-
vincing evidence that Congress would not have granted home rule to the District of Columbia
without the legislative veto. Accordingly, because the unconstitutional legislative veto provi-
sions cannot be severed from the remainder of the Home Rule Act, the entire scheme of home
rule for the District as it now stands is invalid. Another example of a delegation of extraordi-
nary authority in which the legislative veto provision is inseverable is the Federal Salary Act,
2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1982), under which Congress delegated to the President the authority to
adjust civil service pay scales subject to a legislative veto. See 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1982). Prior to
Chadha, a lower court found the legislative veto in the Federal Salary Act inseverable and,
therefore, denied a challenge to the veto of a pay increase. McCorkle v. United States, 559
F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). In light of the extraordinary
authority delegated under the Act, the decision was correct.
89 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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Whether a particular legislative veto can be challenged after
Chadha will depend on the nature of the statute containing the veto pro-
vision. The following discussion of standing and its relationship to sev-
erability uses two criteria to classify legislative veto statutes and to
determine which statutes will remain safe from a Chadha challenge be-
cause of standing defects. The first criterion is whether the legislative
veto provision in the statute is severable. The second criterion is
whether the statute operates only to confer benefits, such as the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, or whether the statute also regulates be-
havior and, therefore, requires governmental enforcement actions. The
matrix of these two criteria determines whether severability and stand-
ing considerations will preclude judicial review of legislative veto
provisions.
1. Severable Benefit Statutes
A party will have standing to challenge a legislative veto provision
if the provision is severable and contained in a statute that operates only
to confer benefits. This, of course, was the precise nature of the statute
involved in Chadha. The plaintiff sought a benefit conferred by the stat-
ute, namely the suspension of a deportation order, and the Court found
the legislative veto in the statute severable. Because the statutory provi-
sions that allowed the Attorney General to grant relief remained valid
after the veto provision was severed, Chadha had standing to challenge
the House veto and enforce the benefits he had obtained from the Attor-
ney General's order suspending deportation.
2. Severable Regulatory Statutes
Regulatory statutes that contain severable legislative vetoes will
also be subject to attack after Chadha. Normally, when Congress vetoes
a regulatory action, it has acted at the behest of the regulated parties,
who thus have no reason to challenge the legislative veto.90 Parties inter-
ested in rigorous regulatory action such as consumer and environmental
groups, however, may desire to challenge the veto. These groups have a
judicially cognizable interest in rigorous enforcement of regulatory stat-
utes, 91 and will have standing to challenge a legislative veto because the
statutory authority for the regulatory action they seek to vindicate is
severable from the legislative veto. In Consumer Energy Council of America
90 Used car dealers, for example, persuaded Congress to veto an FTC regulation requir-
ing certain disclosures in the sales of used cars. See Consumers Union of U.S. v. FTC, 691
F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
91 See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aJ'dmem. and cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); see also Consumers
Union of U.S. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), a dmem. andcert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
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v. Federal Energy Regulatogy Commission,92 for example, Congress vetoed a
new natural gas price regulation that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) had promulgated, and the FERC complied with
the veto by withdrawing the regulation. Consumer groups that favored
the regulation challenged the legislative veto. The court found the legis-
lative veto invalid and severable, and reinstated the regulation.
9 3
Because severability permits a court to strike out an invalid provi-
sion such as the legislative veto without requiring Congress to enact new
legislation, its impact on both regulatory statutes and statutes that con-
fer benefits extends beyond the standing issue. Given that the authority
delegated to an agency will generally be found severable from the legis-
lative veto, the agencies can continue to exercise the authority delegated
and will be able to enforce regulatory actions even if Congress attempts
to veto the action. A defendant to such an action could not rely on a
congressional veto because the veto would be invalid and the agency
authority for the regulatory action is severable from the veto. Adminis-
trative agencies could obviate the need for litigation to challenge future
legislative vetoes and concern over potential standing challenges if they
simply refused to comply with future legislative vetoes.
94
3. Inseverable Regulatogy Statutes
When a regulatory statute contains an inseverable legislative veto,
a party favoring a regulatory action under the statute will not have
standing to challenge a legislative veto of that action. In contrast, a
defendant to an enforcement action based on regulatory action Congress
does not veto should have standing to assert a Chadha challenge against
a regulatory statute containing an inseverable legislative veto.
A congressional veto of a new regulatory action authorized by a
92 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afdmem and cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
93 FERC had contended that the groups could not challenge the veto because it had
withdrawn the regulation, thereby making the veto of the regulation moot. The court re-
jected this assertion and allowed the Consumer Energy Council to challenge the veto. 673
F.2d at 445.
94 The preferable course is for administrative agencies to disregard future legislative ve-
toes. Despite the absence of standing difficulties, litigation to force an agency to pursue a
regulatory course may prove difficult. In Chadha, it was a simple matter for the Court to
order the Attorney General not to deport Chadha. It is more difficult for a court to order an
agency to enforce a set of regulations. In Consumer Energy Council, for example, the court found
the legislative veto invalid and ordered the withdrawn regulations reinstated on the narrow
ground that FERC's withdrawal of the regulations did not comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act. 673 F.2d at 445. The court did not address the question of whether FERC
could have complied with the legislative veto if its withdrawal of the regulations had been in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. Courts should adopt a rule that
agencies cannot comply with legislative vetoes. Such a rule is necessary to make the Court's
decision in Chadha completely effective. In Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1983),
a court invalidated regulations an agency promulgated after making several revisions in re-
sponse to legislative vetoes.
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statute from which the veto provision is inseverable cannot be chal-
lenged by a group that favored the action. A successful attack on the
veto provision will necessarily invalidate the statutory authority for the
action. Because the interested group could not hope to reinstate the
vetoed regulatory action, it would not have standing to challenge the
veto. For example, a party that favored an action of the District of Co-
lumbia's government subsequently vetoed by Congress under the Home
Rule Act would not have standing to challenge that veto. The authority
for the local District government to legislate on local matters is not sev-
erable from Congress's legislative veto of its actions.95 Thus, invalidating
the legislative veto would also invalidate the District's authority and
preempt the basis upon which a party favoring a local government ac-
tion could seek relief.
Courts, however, can enforce the Chadha decision in the case of in-
severable regulatory statues by blocking any governmental enforcement
actions under the statute. For example, consider a case in which the
District of Columbia council passes a law authorizing certain condem-
nations. A defendant resisting a condemnation proceeding could argue
that the legislative veto provisions are invalid and inseverable from the
enabling provisions in the Home Rule Act. 96 Because the entire Home
Rule Act would be invalid if the defendant prevailed on that point, the
District would have no authority to condemn, and the court would have
to decline to enforce the condemnation. 97 If courts decline to enforce
District council actions on this ground, Congress will be forced to enact
a new District charter.
Courts might hesitate to allow a Chadha challenge to a governmen-
tal action, such as that in the above hypothetical, when Congress has
not even exercised the veto power.98 Courts should hear such chal-
95 See supra note 88.
96 See id.
97 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224
(S.D. Miss. 1983), appeal dismissedfor want ofjurisdiction, 52 U.S.L.W. 3889 (1984). In Allstate,
the EEOC filed suit under authority that had been granted through a reorganization plan.
The act authorizing the reorganization contained a legislative veto. The court found the veto
invalid and inseverable and, therefore, invalidated the reorganization. Accordingly, the
EEOC was without authority to conduct the suit, and the defendant obtained summary judg-
ment. Another district court refused to follow Allstate, arguing that the legislative veto in the
reorganization plan is severable. Muller Optical Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 574 F. Supp. 946, 953 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
98 Prior to Chadha, two courts had refused to consider such a challenge. See Clark v.
Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 649 & n.8 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), afdsub noma. Clark v. Kimmett, 431 U.S.
950 (1977); Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1349 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (refusing to address constitutionality of legislative veto where Congress has not exer-
cised veto). The court of appeals in Clark argued that it should not decide the question of the
constitutionality of the legislative veto except in a concrete case where Congress had actually
exercised the procedure. 559 F.2d at 649. The court noted, however, that if the veto were
patently unconstituitonal, it might consider invalidating a statute even where Congress had
not exercised the veto. Id. at 649 n.8.
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lenges, however, because the veto has a "two-edged" effect that taints all
actions taken under the authority of a statute that contains an insever-
able legislative veto.99 One effect, of course, is when Congress actually
vetoes an agency decision. In addition, the mere possibility of a veto,
also allows Congress to influence administrative decisions even when it
ultimately does not exercise the power. The "two-edged" effect will be
most profound if Congress continues to exercise the power. The strong-
est case for a Chadha challenge would occur if Congress vetoes a set of
regulations and the agency responds with new regulations. A defendant
to an enforcement action could convincingly argue that the new regula-
tions were tainted by unconstitutional influence, and are therefore
invalid.100
4. Inseverable Statutes that Confer Benefits
In the case of inseverable statutes that only confer benefits, stand-
ing considerations will completely bar judicial review of legislative veto
provisions. If, for example, the Court in Chadha, had found the legisla-
tive veto inseverable from the remainder of the Act, Chadha could not
have challenged the House's veto resolution. The Attorney General's au-
thority to suspend deportation proceedings would have been struck
down along with the legislative veto. Without that authority in the At-
torney General, Chadha could not have obtained the statutory benefit
he sought and, therefore, would not have had a redressable injury. Fur-
thermore, the analysis suggested above for challenging inseverable regu-
latory statutes is not applicable to statutes that confer benefits: because
the government has no reason to pursue enforcement actions with re-
gard to statutes that only confer benefits, no opportunity is provided to
assert such a defense. Ultimately, no party stands to gain relief or es-
cape injury by invalidating such a statute in its entirety and, thus, no
party has standing to challenge inseverable legislative vetoes contained
within the statute.101
The Federal Salary Act illustrates this situation.10 2 In the Salary
99 See Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642i 667 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (opinion of Robinson, J.,
dissenting), af'dsub nom. Clark v. Kimmett, 431 U.S. 950 (1977); see also Nathanson, supra note
76, at 1091 ("The threat of veto may also deflect the administrative agencies away from
objective consideration of... issues toward bargaining processes with congressional commit-
tee staffs who may or may not reflect the majority views of the Congress.").
100 In Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1983), the court invalidated regula-
tions that controlled public access to Watergate materials. Congress had vetoed four prior
sets of regulations and the court therefore found the fifth set irreparably tainted by improper
congressional interference. 578 F. Supp. at 969.
101 The INS brief in Chadha pointed out the danger of denying standing on this ground.
"[T]he reasoning ... is not limited to Section 244; following their logic, a legislature could
insulate any unconstitutional aspect of a benefit program from challenge simply by specifying
that the constitutionally dubious aspect is not severable from the remainder of the program."
Brief for INS at 75, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
102 See supra note 88.
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Act, Congress delegated to the President the authority to adjust the civil
service pay scales, subject to a legislative veto. 10 3 In light of the ex-
traordinary authority delegated under the Act, the legislative veto prob-
ably is not severable from the delegation. 10 4 Accordingly, if Congress
vetoed a proposed salary increase, a civil servant aggrieved by the veto
could not challenge the veto in court without also challenging the Presi-
dent's authority to propose pay increases. Without the statutory basis
upon which to base the remedy, the court could not order the pay in-
crease to take effect.
Because no party will have standing to challenge legislative vetoes
deemed inseverable from statutes that confer benefits, the future of those
legislative vetoes is a matter for the political branches to resolve. If Con-
gress remains stalwart, these legislative vetoes may survive. Congress
should, however, comply with Chadha by enacting new legislation to re-
place statutes conferring benefits that contain inseverable legislative
vetoes.
CONCLUSION
In Chadha the Court invalidated a congressional action that was
poorly considered and unfair to Chadha, a resident alien. The Court
characterized the legislative veto as a short cut around the constitutional
requirements for legislation.
The effect of the Court's decision may be muted, however, if Con-
gress continues to contest the validity of the legislative veto. Neverthe-
less, the Court's approach to severability should reduce the possibility
that future litigation over the legislative veto will become mired in argu-
ments over the presence or absence of standing. Courts should continue
to view severability and standing issues flexibly so that future legislative
vetoes do not evade judicial review.
Jonathan B. Fellows
103 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1982).
104 See supra note 88.
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